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This research considers whether the principles developed to analyze the optimal
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activities provide the primary means to deliver different amounts of public and quasi-public
goods.  The analysis evaluates how devolution affects the development of benefit cost analyses
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Does Nature Limit Environmental Federalism?
V. Kerry Smith, Kurt A. Schwabe, and Carol Mansfield*
I. INTRODUCTION
Devolution left the sidelines of public policy and entered center stage with the 1994
election.  Recent Republican congressional victories reinforced this call for changing the scope
for federalism with a shift in responsibility for public services from the federal to the state and
local levels.  No economist has contributed more to the important theoretical and empirical
issues of fiscal federalism than Wallace Oates, who this volume honors.  As he observed in his
collected essays on federalism (Oates [1991]), his Ph.D. thesis was motivated by Musgrave's
[1959] initial treatment of the subject.1  More than 30 years have passed since Wally's Ph.D.
thesis started defining what most of us now understand about the preference, production, and
taxation issues underlying the role of the various levels of government in the provision of
different types of public and private goods.  Moreover, few analysts would suggest that the
conceptual dimensions of his work need to be revisited.  Instead, like Gold [1996], they argue
it is the set of empirical "realities" of these choices that need to be periodically updated with
new, more specific (to current problems) information.
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1 Musgrave's three way categorization of the functions of government (i.e., allocation, distribution, and stabilization)
argues that allocation issues are motivated largely through preference differences.  This may be the reason why
production advantages were not addressed in the same detail as preference heterogeneity in the early discussions of
federalism.  Oates [1991] cites Musgrave's key description of the fiscal federalism question as follows:  "The heart of
fiscal federalism thus lies in the proposition that the policies of the Allocation Branch should be permitted to differ
between states, depending on the preferences of their citizens." (Musgrave [1959] pp. 181-182).Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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In a somewhat different context, comparable arguments are being made concerning the
organization of responsibilities for regulating of activities that affect environmental resources.
Schoenbrod [1996], for example, contends that EPA should be changed in dramatic terms that
would remove nearly all its regulatory authority.2  Under such new rules it ". . . could retain its
leadership role only by convincing states to adopt its regulations by the quality and sensibility
of its [proposed] policies."3  There is no formal analysis that underlies his conclusion and even
less empirical evidence.  This absence of attention to the details has not diminished enthusiasm
for environmental devolution.  The most ardent advocates of applying federalism concepts to
environmental regulation suggest that the trends for environmental improvement were
underway before the national legislation of the 1970's establishing a goal of uniform levels of
environmental quality was passed.4
In contrast to this perspective, there is some recent convincing evidence that the federal
air quality standards were effective in targeting private responses.  That is, to the extent we
accept the statistic used to define the ambient standard as an adequate measure of the form of air
pollution that can have health effects, then the standard serves an important role in targeting
specific types of improvements (e.g. the severe episodes of pollution versus long term average
                                               
2 Schoenbrod's proposal to reform EPA is best described in his own summary:  "The Environmental Protection
Agency should be stripped of its power with four exceptions.  First, it should gather and publicize information
on pollution and its consequences, both on the national and the local level.  Second, it should propose to
Congress rules of conduct to control types of interstate pollution that are not adequately addressed by the states
or that require special protection, such as the Grand Canyon.  Third, it should propose to Congress rules of
conduct for goods, such as new cars, when state-by-state regulation would erect significant barriers to interstate
commerce.  Fourth, it should draft model state environmental laws and conduct policy studies that states could
use when considering whether to enact such laws.  States, however, should be free to amend or reflect federal
proposals in favor of different approaches to pollution control." (p. 24).
3 Schoenbrod [1996] p. 25, bracketed term added.
4 Crandall [1985] suggested that substantial progress had been made prior to the 1970s in the case of air quality.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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levels).  Henderson's [1996] recent analysis of the distribution of ozone reading across
monitoring stations from 1977 to 1987 provides a convincing example of how the form of the
standard can definitely affect the nature of the response.  Evaluated using the statistic that defines
the standard (the second highest daily maximum), there is a clear shift down in the estimated
mode and a tightening in the estimated spread of the distribution.  No change in the approximate
mode would have been detected using distributions across stations for the annual mean
concentration over the same period.  There was a tightening in these distributions, but this
change came largely at the expense of reducing air quality at the cleaner areas (measured by
averages).  Thus, in this case we have evidence that national standards did have impact on the
distribution of air quality around the U.S.
Limited attention has been given to applying the principles developed to assist in selecting
the optimal jurisdiction to provide "produced" public goods for a different situation where
government does not produce the public good.  These cases arise where regulations of private
activities are the primary means to "deliver" some types of public goods.  This paper begins this
process by considering factors that may limit the devolution of environmental regulations.  We use
the theoretical framework underlying benefit-cost analysis to describe devolution as an issue
arising from defining "the extent of the regulatory market" for such analyses.  A case study of
nutrient control for the Neuse River in North Carolina illustrates how benefit cost analysis
requires some resolution of the issue.  That is in order to develop measures of the benefits and the
costs, assumptions must be made about both consumer preferences and the production activities
that influence the quality of the river.
Section II uses the Bradford [1970] aggregate bid function to describe how strategic
separability assumptions underlie most arguments for decentralizing environmentalSmith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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policymaking.  In Section III we summarize the estimates of the benefits and the costs for a plan
for nutrient control along the Neuse River.  Our primary focus is on the impact of the judgments
about the regulatory jurisdiction for components of the net benefits of different nutrient control
targets.  The last section discusses the implications of this illustrative analysis.  We argue that
nature "trumps" most of the conventional arguments for devolution.  That is, the linkages
environmental resources create between activities taking place at different locations must
ultimately limit the extent of independence in decision making.  Preference based considerations
can also lead to the need to impose more stringent control (and higher levels of quality) because
the impacted environmental resources are important to people outside a jurisdiction defined by
physical linkages alone.  Both aspects of the task of delivering public goods efficiently must be
considered in making decisions about the levels of government given responsibility for the
design, implementation, and enforcement of environmental regulations.
II. EFFICIENCY  AND  DEVOLUTION
A key premise of those arguing for decentralization of public sector responsibilities is
that most public goods are local, with production processes that do not exhibit appreciable
scale economies.  As a result we expect, through a Tiebout [1956] argument, increased
prospects for both the variety (across jurisdictions) in the offerings of public goods available to
consumers and a form of competition (among jurisdictions for citizens) that limits a central
government's monopoly taxation policies (Brennan and Buchanan [1977]).  In the case of
policies intended to maintain or enhance environmental resources, the ability to reproduce
environmental public goods is limited by the spatial distribution of natural assets that generate
these services as well as by the spatial interconnections in the consequences of economicSmith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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The condition for an efficient allocation of resources between a private good and a public good
can be used to organize some of the issues that arise in discussions of fiscal federalism.  Based
on that development, it is then possible to consider how these arguments should be amended to
consider what is likely to be the appropriate jurisdiction for environmental regulations.
Consider first the introduction of public financing for increments in q.  A simple
approximation to the efficiency condition given in (4) involves multiplying the MRT (or the
private opportunity cost of increments to the public good) by what is often referred to as the
marginal cost of public funds(MCF).5  This adjustment arises from a recognition of the welfare
losses due to the distortionary effects of most tax systems.  If all public goods were financed
through lump sum taxes then MCF would equal one, otherwise, it is generally held to be greater
than one.6  Thus, with this approximation, (4) becomes equation (5).
(5)                           MCF MRT MRS xq
i
i
xq ￿ = ￿
Conventional discussions of federalism assume we can classify the cases where: (a) the
technology warrants a federal solution (i.e., based on properties of the MRT term); (b) the
practical financing issues imply a specific level of government based on ease or efficiency in
collecting required taxes;7 or (c) the diversity in preferences warrant variety in public good
levels (the MRS terms).  Implicit in this simplified classification is a set of separability
assumptions for both individual preferences and for whatever is assumed to be the process
                                               
5 Ballard and Fullerton [1992] provide an excellent summary of the optimal taxation literature in relation to
estimates of the excess burden due to distortionary taxes and its role in evaluating the efficiency conditions for
public goods.  For more recent discussions of these issues in the context of measuring the costs of
environmental regulations see Burtraw et. al. [1996] and Fullerton and Metcalf [1996].
6 Some estimates imply values that are substantially larger, in the range of 1.30 to 1.50 (Repetto, et. al. [1992]).
7 This is largely outside the simplified framework of equation (5), but which would ultimately impact the MCF effect.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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associated with the production of q.  If q is not separable from the activities taxed to finance
increases in the public good then the simple expression (and assumption of locally constant
values of MCF) collapses.  When we consider evaluating the issues posed by federalism,
recognizing that changing q usually arises through some form of regulation on private
activities, we expect that there will be modifications in production activities for the private
goods linked in some way to q, and with these, changes in the MRT term.
There are several dimensions of these changes.  In partial equilibrium terms we expect
marginal costs of q as well as other commodities held to be "responsible" for changes in q to
change.  These effects will have general equilibrium consequences.  The public good in these
situations is usually assumed to be associated with the services of natural assets that are
impacted by the production activities involved with other private goods.  As a result the
interactions between the responses of q to these private goods depends on the environmental
system and production activities.  With such linkages it is reasonable to expect that people will
be affected differentially by the measures used to change q.  Returning to the air pollution
example, this point simply reflects the fact that efforts to control air pollution in the northeast
depend on the activities of firms and consumers in the region and the decisions of power plants
outside the region.  Households in these other areas may well not experience beneficial effects
of the regulation (i.e., for them the dq need not be positive).  Nonetheless, they will be affected
by the increased private costs.
These linkages do not simply affect how we add up who gets how much of the dq (the
left side of equation (5)) but, equally important, they impact the nature of the change in the
costs that give rise to the general equilibrium effects on MRT.  Analyses that focus exclusivelySmith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
8
on the market related general equilibrium effects and do not include the environmental effects
in the models miss these impacts.
Linkages through markets can be important as well.  The lessons from efforts to
compute the social costs of environmental regulations suggest these are not simple adjustments
(see Hazilla and Kopp, [1990] and Jorgenson and Wilcoxen [1990]).  The numerical size of
these general equilibrium effects can be at least the magnitude of the MCF adjustments.  All of
these effects are "buried" in the details of computing approximate estimates of the terms we
would want to place in equation (5) for the MRS's, the MRT and MCF effects.  They imply
that the spatial dimensions of the environmental resources linking private activities to the
public good matter.  This point is, of course, not a new one.  To our knowledge, however, it
has not been integrated into discussions of federalism.  Later in this section we will suggest
why we think it is likely to grow in importance.  Before turning to another difference in the
way the level of government must be addressed for the case of environmental federalism it is
useful to look at what has been said on these issues in the past literature.
The most significant early discussion can be found in the early work of Allen Kneese
and colleagues at Resources for the Future in developing the Delaware Estuary model (see
Kneese and Bower [1979]).8  Environmental linkages were the central motivation for these
models.  Indeed the whole research program was organized with an explicit recognition that
                                               
8 To our knowledge, Haefele and Kneese [1973] provide the first integrated discussion in the economic and
political economy dimensions of optimal jurisdiction.  While their paper recognized the interactions between the
physical or environmental limits on federalism, it seems to implicitly assume that environmental constraints define
what they refer to as a "problemshed" and other factors must be considered within this pre-defined unit of analysis.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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the regional locus of environmental quality management was a key decision.9  Their realization
of the importance of the regional perspective lead to more than a decade of research
developing regional models for environmental quality management.  These models attempted
to describe the economic, environmental, and political dimensions of alternative policy
decisions.  They began from a spatial premise -- the definition of a regional unit of analysis
largely based on environmental criteria.  Their most detailed case involved the lower Delaware
Valley.  However, there was no analysis of different scales of regional analysis.  The region
was treated as a maintained assumption for all the rest of their analysis.
Regulatory federalism makes this definition a part of the problem for analysis.  If we
could assume the technical linkages were well known then they could be assumed to comprise
one component of the set of constraints that condition the economic decisions of private
citizens and local governments assigned responsibility for different environmental public goods.
Final decisions about the ideal jurisdiction could focus more on the preference side of
equation(s).  Unfortunately, this set of circumstances is not fulfilled.10  Examples of the
difficulties posed by uncertainty over the nature and costs of external effects are among the
important reasons for questioning the real world performance of incentive based policies.
                                               
9 One example of this role can be found in Kneese and Bower's description of how to start the environmental
quality management problems.  They note that it is necessary to start at the regional level, for their region
embodied the key unit analysis because it incorporated environmental constraints. "It is necessary to use a word
like regional rather than terms pertaining to political jurisdictions, such as nations, states, or cities because the
extent of ambient environmental quality changes resulting from the discharge of materials and energy follow
the meteorological, hydrological, and biological systems rather than the boundaries of political systems" (p16).
10 Indeed, there are good reasons to question whether the information assumed to be available to private
individuals and firms in models of individual adjustment to environmental circumstances, such as hedonic
models, as implausible.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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Moreover, these types of issues are not limited to environmental quality management.
They are present in varying degrees with the services of other environmental resources.  For
example, the principles underlying the establishment of the national park system or the wilderness
system were based on the premise that these different types of land areas could be set aside and
managed to achieve their respective preservation and recreation objectives largely independent of
what happened to the land around them.  This view of the technical process of managing habitat
would imply that one could assign responsibility for any particular park (or wilderness area) based
exclusively on the left side of equation (5).  There is now growing appreciation that there are
zones of influence around these reserves that affect the environmental services that they
provide.11  The specifics differ depending both on the environmental resources involved and the
external activities in each location, but the general issue is the same.  There is an extended general
equilibrium system that connects both sides of equation (5).  The effects of the economic
component of that general equilibrium system have been recognized for some time with the early
writings on second-best and optimal taxation.  They are largely "controlled" in analytical work
through strategic separability assumptions imposed on preferences or production relationships.12
These have been questioned by many authors before us and a common response is that without
them we have no hope of simplified policy judgments.13
                                               
11 Botkin's [1990] arguments for a new ecology are examples of this difference in perspective.  Christensen,
et. al. [1996] have noted, based on these changing perspectives for ecosystems that management focusing on
commodity outputs alone and failing to recognize the influence of surrounding areas is not sustainable.
12 There are numerous examples of these in discussions in the double dividend literature.  See Goulder et. al.
[1996] and Fullerton and Metcalf [1996] as examples.
13 Deaton [1987] is often attributed with highlighting the importance and plausibility in some circumstances of
the separability restrictions required for the tractable versions of optimal taxation results.  We are grateful to
Jim Poterba for calling this work to our attention.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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This may be a plausible argument for public goods that are produced by the government.
It is not relevant to those associated with environmental public goods because there are linkages
connecting activities outside the conventional boundaries used to define production and
preference relationships.  As a result, we can expect extended general equilibrium effects in
addition to the preference and the production based contributions to the incremental opportunity
costs measured in expressions like our equation (5).14
There is another aspect of the conditions for efficient allocation of resources that is
sometimes overlooked.  This issue relates to the number of people assumed to "care about" the
level of q.  It is also an important consideration for the calculations implicit in (5) (or in
Bradford's counterpart to (5) that is used to rationalize benefit cost analysis).  As a rule,
discussions of this issue in the context of local public goods follow the logic Oates [1972, 1977]
developed.  That is, the welfare gains or losses due to centralization of the decisions about the
amount of a public good to provide are generally held to depend on the heterogeneity in the
levels of individual demand for a given "price" and the price elasticities of the individuals'
demands.  This approach assumes that the goods can be reproduced in different locations.  For
several dimensions of environmental quality (e.g. clean air, water, etc.) this characterization may
be true.  In those cases the linkage effects we discussed earlier require more complex analysis to
account for the interactions leading to the marginal benefit and cost terms.  However, national
parks and other natural assets give rise to a different type of environmental public good.  In
                                               
14 For a discussion of these issues in the context of a computable general equilibrium model with a
nonseparable treatment of the effects of air pollution on people's preferences see Smith and Espinosa [1996].Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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these cases, decisions about who counts in the sum of the 
i
xq MRS  terms on the left side of
equation (5) are especially important to the amount of the public good that is provided.15
This issue is one of the most contentious questions in the current literature associated
with non-market valuation of environment resources.  Often it is described in terms of the
"nonuse values" for environmental resources.16  However, the issues extend beyond nonuse or
existence values.  To the extent people outside the region assigned with responsibility for
decision about increments to q also have an economic stake in what is done, but are not
counted, then decentralization inevitably leads to welfare losses.  The nature of their stake can
be infrequent patterns of use, expected future use, or motives attributed to nonuse or existence
values.  This argument relies on the assumption that fairly close substitutes for the resources
are not available in locations where the individuals involved do have some "say" in the
allocation decisions.  Thus, nonseparability arisi0ng from linkages in the environmental system
and extent of the economic market for q are two new dimensions added to the issues affecting
the extent of regulatory federalism for environmental resources.
These questions are not simply "grist" for an academic debate.  They are made each
time a benefit-cost analysis is undertaken to evaluate the efficiency of a regulation whether at
the federal or more regional level.  We need only recast equation (5) into the form Bradford
used to motivate these analyses.  The same questions addressed in judging a decentralized
                                               
15 If we write out  MRSxq
i
i







, then it is the "n".
16 See Freeman [1993] for an overview of the various definitions for nonuse value.  The original concept of
existence value is due to Krutilla [1967].Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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delivery of public goods arise with decentralized regulation.  In the past few years benefit-cost
mandates have started to become a part of rulemaking at the state level.  As states have
recognized the need to consider the economic consequences of their rules, they have adopted
some form of benefit cost analysis.  Over twenty states now have benefit cost requirements for
their own rules.  As Whisnant and Cherry [1996] observed recently, there are few incentives
to confront external effects that extend across state boundaries whether they arise from
environmental linkages or consumer preferences for resources that are outside their state of
residence.17  Moreover, lack of accurate data on the effects at increasing distances from
activities within the state, together with a presumption that those impacted are themselves
adjusting and mitigating the impacts, makes the analysis required to determine a prudent
assignment of responsibility exceed the limits of most states' analytical capacities.
Most economists, writing about the issues posed by regulatory federalism, and even
advocates of devolution appear to be willing to concede that environmental linkages set limits
to devolution.18  Unfortunately this focuses exclusively on the supply-side of the problem.  It
does not address how the devolved authority deals with those outside the immediate zone of
policy influence but who may have a "stake" in the outcome.  In the next section we use the
benefit-cost analysis of nutrient control for the Neuse River basin in North Carolina to
illustrate the impact of how consideration of both cost and aggregate value can affect the
choices made in a decentralized regulatory system.
                                               
17 These authors observed, ". . . a state has little or now incentive to issue rules that costs its taxpayers -- more
importantly, its voters -- for the benefit of the citizens of other states" (p. 736).
18 Anderson and Hill [1996], suggest:  ". . . the following principle should guide environmental federalism:  To
minimize the costs of monitoring regulatory agencies, authority should devolve to the lowest level of
government that also allows for control of pollution other spillover effects" (p. 9).Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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III. NUTRIENTS  IN  THE  NEUSE  RIVER:  A  CASE  STUDY
Most environmental management problems must be treated in a spatial context.19
There are two ways in which it is important.  First, nature links activities undertaken in one
location with outcomes in another.  Second, most environmental resources are best evaluated
as assets in specific "places."  There are good reasons to believe people will care about the
state of the environmental assets in many locations in addition to those "close" to their
residence.  To illustrate both considerations as limits to devolution, we use a water quality
management issue in North Carolina.  It involves different locations within the state and the
divergence in uses and consequences for a natural resource--the Neuse River.  The questions
raised by this case study are equally relevant to the federalism debate.20
The Neuse River Basin, with over 3,000 stream miles extends from nearly the north
western boundary of North Carolina continuous with Virginia, to the Pamlico Sound in New
Bern.  Over the past two years, the river has been the subject of much local and national
attention due to fish kills attributed to excess nutrients.  Considerable evidence has also been
accumulated indicating that toxic dinoflagellates may be involved.  Indeed, a nutrient
management strategy for the Neuse River was the first rule subjected to a fiscal note (required
by the North Carolina's mandate for economic analysis of regulations).  This note evaluates the
                                               
19 As we have suggested, RFF's Quality of the Environment Program of the 1970's was organized to integrate
this insight into all the models used to evaluate policy instruments.  It has also been an important part of
Wally's work on environmental policies with his Ph.D. students.  See Krupnick, Oates, and Van De Verg
[1983], McGartland and Oates [1985] and Oates, Portney, and McGartland [1989].
20 After the research for this paper was finished, the Raleigh News and Observer (January 31, 1997) reported
that the EPA was taking steps (in response to a suit filed December 31, 1996 by the Neuse River Foundation) to
enforce a provision in the Clean Water Act that requires states to set firm thresholds on the total waste a river
can absorb daily from all sources.  This would make our case study directly parallel to the conceptual issues
underlying regulatory federalism, not due to the geographic boundaries but rather federal mandates for
consistent measures for the waste handling capacities of river.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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impacts of proposed policies to reduce nitrogen loadings throughout the Neuse River basin by
at least 30 percent.
Analysis of this proposal requires addressing the same issues being posed under the
mantel of regulatory federalism.  Our case study illustrates the potential importance of any
proposal to arbitrarily assign responsibility for environmental regulations to a specific level of
government.  It is organized in three parts.  The first uses a large scale nutrient balance,
process model for the Neuse River basin to illustrate how the activities identified as
contributing nutrient loadings influence the cost estimates developed for different levels of
control.  This analysis demonstrates how devolution can influence the opportunity costs
attributed to a regulation.
The second uses the model to evaluate a pure incentive based policy for meeting the 30
percent reduction envisioned by the plan.  It focuses on the distribution of costs across the 12
counties included in Schwabe's [1996] model of the river basin.  This distribution illustrates
how environmental linkages, together with the spatial location of activities, influences the cost
estimates for nutrient control measured based on the nitrogen loadings that reach the Pamlico
Sound.  The last combines the cost estimates by county with benefit estimates developed based
on a telephone-mail-telephone survey of households in North Carolina conducted from
November 1995 through January 1996.  This survey was designed to evaluate whether
households would support policies to reduce nitrogen loadings from swine operations that
impact the same coastal areas.  Net benefits are measured for each county as well as for the
state as a whole to illustrate how the extent and composition of the regulatory market can
influence the evaluation offered by the economic analysis.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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TABLE 1:  Costs for 30% Nutrient Reduction in the Neuse River:










Total Costsa $157,273 $162,449 $165,264 $163,665 $166,479
Control Costsa ￿ $5,176 $7,991 $6,392 $9,206
Cost per Pound Removed ￿ $4.76 $5.74 $5.37 $6.15
Unit Control Cost as % of
Complete Model's Unit Cost
Estimates
￿ 77 93 87 ￿
a  These costs are measured in thousands of dollars.  They are annual costs and do not include land costs.
b  WWTP designated the eighteen major wastewater treatment plants included in the Schwabe model.
A. Nutrient Control Costs
Table 1 summarizes the control cost estimates for a 30 percent reduction in nitrogen
loadings with four different versions of the Schwabe model.  The first includes only cropping
activities.  This entails treating each county as if it were a cost minimizing farm producing one
or more field crops -- corn, cotton or soybeans with different cropping systems and nitrogen
control practices (including conservation tillage, controlled drainage, and vegetative filter
strips).  Land is distinguished by characteristics for nutrient runoff with three indexes --
erodibility, slope, and transmissivity.  Crop land is distinguished into the Piedmont, Upper
Coastal and Lower Coastal Plains to account for yield differences.21  The production activities
are adjusted based on the technical characteristics of the land in each area.
The second model adds to the cropping activities 18 wastewater treatment plants
located along the Neuse River, allowing for primary and secondary treatment of nitrogen
where the equipment available suggests these levels of treatment are feasible.  The third model
                                               
21 See Figure 1 for the definitions of these areas.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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includes nitrogen loadings from swine operations along with the cropping activities model, but
does not allow for control options at these locations.  This specification increases the base
loading estimates and this requires greater effort on the part of the cropping activities to meet a
30 percent reduction.  The last model combines all three components.  All four cases consider
command and control (CAC) regulations to meet the 30 percent reduction.
North Carolina's Division of Water Quality estimates that 8.7 million pounds of nitrogen
enter the Pamlico Estuary from the Neuse River each year.  About 2.1 million pounds of this total
are attributed to point sources, the remaining 6.6 million to nonpoint sources.  By varying the
composition of the point and nonpoint sources included in the Schwabe model, we can see
dramatic differences in the estimates of control costs.  To some extent, the total control cost
estimates may be misleading because what counts as a cost and the actual amount nitrogen
removed from the effluent stream varies across these models.  That is, the baseline loadings varies
with the composition of the sources represented in each version of the model.  To reflect this effect
the third row reports the unit cost per pound removed from the waste stream (measured at the
estuary).  These average costs range from $4.76 to $6.15 depending on the composition of the
model.  This is nearly a 25 percent difference in unit cost estimates arising simply due to the
activities allowed to count as contributing to the nutrient problem in the Neuse River.  Thus, the
issues posed in accounting for sources of nitrogen loadings parallel the questions that arise in
defining a jurisdiction for environmental regulations.  These cost differences illustrate the types of
impacts such decisions have on the definition of nutrient standards by directly influencing the
estimated costs associated with any environmental quality goal.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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Sources Point Sources Total Cost
Average Cost
per lb removed
Orange 121.4 ￿ 121.4 174.5
Durham 8.5 ￿ 8.5 92.6
Wake 207.7 1125.4 1333.1 8.1
Johnston 728.4 202.3 930.7 6.7
Nash 240.0 ￿ 240.0 7.4
Wilson 436.7 255.2 691.9 12.4
Wayne 936.1 15.6 951.7 4.1
Greene 724.4 ￿ 724.4 5.1
Lenoir 936.2 1166.1 2102.3 7.4
Pitt 504.9 ￿ 504.9 2.5
Jones 671.6 ￿ 671.6 11.4
Craven 875.7 50.4 926.1 5.7
a  These costs are measured in thousands of 1994 dollars.  The estimates are developed from results reported in
Schwabe [1996].
B. Spatial Disaggregation
Table 2 disaggregates the implied costs under a CAC policy with each county's cropping
activities and point sources required to reduce loadings by 30 percent (where it is technically
feasible).  The first three columns detail the non-point, point, and total costs of realizing the 30
percent reduction.  The last column reports the unit costs per pound of nitrogen removed
measured at the sound.  Clearly there are wide differences in the average costs.  As in the case of
re-evaluation of different mixes of source types included in determining the "incremental costs"
measured for the area as a whole, small changes in the spatial composition of the regulated area
will definitely change the costs of control.  The measured differences in unit costs across counties
imply substantial scope for gains from trade (i.e., incentive based policies).  Part of the reason for
these differences stems from the characteristics of the land in each county and its location in
relation to the Pamlico Sound.  Because nitrogen loadings are measured in equivalent units at NewSmith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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Bern, sources in the western portion of the state have the advantage of the river's absorptive
capacity.  Nonetheless, the average cost estimates suggest that control measures in the western
counties would not be cost effective relative to those in the Upper and Middle Coastal Plain.
Limiting the trading areas to a few high or low cost counties treated in isolation such as
Wayne, Lenoir, Pitt, or Craven for the lower unit cost case would lead to an underestimate of
the potential gains from allowing permit trades.  Failure to include counties as sources of
nitrogen also affects the estimated levels of nitrogen loadings; it also imposes greater costs on
the other counties that are identified.  This is the spatial counterpart of our evaluation of
including different types of production sources responsible for nitrogen in the river, including
cropping activities, swine operations, and wastewater treatment plants.
We can develop some insight into the effects of re-allocating responsibilities for meeting
the 30 percent goal by comparing the average cost of a CAC versus an incentive based (IB)
approach.  The former is about $6.24 per pound of nitrogen removed while the IB approach is
about $4.12 per pound.  Table 3 reports the re-allocation in responsibilities for reducing nitrogen
loadings in the two solutions.  The first 12 rows correspond to the cropping activities by county
and the 18 rows designated as point sources are the wastewater treatment plants along the river
that are included in the model.  Clearly the two scenarios assign responsibility for the cleanup
quite differently.  Moreover, this type of change likely understates what might be expected with
different assignments of responsibility for nutrient regulation.22  As Whisnant and Cherry suggest,
there is no reason to expect that devolved systems will have incentives to develop the information
                                               
22 In these comparisons the size of the aggregate reduction in nitrogen loading was held constant.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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necessary to promote assignment of responsibility based on costs, especially if those realizing the
largest cost savings would be outside that system's jurisdiction.















Orange 2,318 1,623 2,318 -696
Durham 307 215 307 -92
Wake 36,848 25,794 36,848 -11,055
Johnston 420,738 294,517 315,964 -21,447
Nonpoint Nash 107,891 75,524 77,714 -2,190
Wilson 125,123 87,586 94,993 -7,407
Wayne 776,746 543,722 583,519 -39,796
Greene 472,552 330,786 319,195 11,592
Lenoir 711,951 498,366 472,437 25,928
Pitt 676,993 473,895 524,966 -51,071
Jones 195,863 137,104 195,863 -58,759
Craven 438,073 306,651 330,268 -23,617
Zebulon 2,087 1,441 2,087 -646
Apex 7,504 5,197 7,504 -2,307
Cary-North 53,010 35,679 53,010 -17,331
Cary-South 50,863 34,386 50,863 -16,477
Burlington 23,274 16,185 14,192 1,993
Wilson 57,840 39,424 57,840 -18,416
Wake 2,310 2,310 2,310 0
Raleigh 330,450 220,374 48,269 172,105
Point Benson 14,940 10,329 7,915 2,414
Johnston 28,167 19,267 28,167 -8,900
Goldsboro 166,568 112,746 69,451 43,295
Farmville 10,215 10,215 10,215 0
Kinston-
Peachtree
64,226 44,381 64,226 -19,845
Contentnea 46,305 31,446 13,297 18,150
Kinston-North 34,560 34,560 29,107 5,453
Dupont 8,110 8,110 8,110 0
New Bern 101,127 69,769 50,648 19,121
Havelock 17,568 17,568 17,568 0
Basinwide 4,984,527 3,489,170 3,489,169 0
a  Solutions derived under county constrained module; Includes cropping activities, wastewater treatment plants, and swine
waste; Cropping activities are responsible for swine waste under command and control; positive values indicate source
assumes more responsibility for nitrogen loading reduction under IB compared to CAC.
b  Source: Schwabe[1996]Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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C. Benefits and Devolution
The benefit side of environmental federalism questions is especially difficult.  As we noted
environmental assets are located in space and can have implications for more than the immediate
neighbors.  Moreover, there are not systematic means to keep track of how all these effects take
place.  Some of them arise from the linkages between production (or consumption) activities and
these assets.  In the case of the Neuse River, farming practices as well as the operations of the
wastewater treatment plants influence water quality along North Carolina's coast around New Bern.
Residents of the area experience the fish kills, algae blooms, odor, and other impacts.
During recreational seasons tourists will also be affected.  Measuring the benefits that would
arise from different regulatory regimes requires a specification of the composition of the "market"
for all the services provided by the environmental asset(s).  Often these decisions focus on the
treatment of use and nonuse values, where the latter is associated with people who may experience
enhanced well-being from improvements in a resource but do not display any behavioral response
that can be attributed to these concerns.  As a result some authors have considered them speculative
and argued that they should not be included in a benefit-cost analysis associated with policies
intended to manage most environmental assets.23  As a practical matter, even within the category of
                                               
23 Diamond and Hausman [1993] appear to equate nonuse values with an expression of ethical beliefs and then
conclude that monetary compensation for natural resource injury and benefit cost evaluations should be based
on individual preferences not ethical judgments.  Nonuse or existence values can also be argued to represent
enhancements to individual preferences that parallel a pure public good (Plourde [1975]).  Under this
perspective one could agree to avoid ethical positions but continue to include nonuse values because of their
relationship to public good services.
    Diamond and Hausman[1994] would also have an objection to this position because such values would have to
be measures with contingent valuation (i.e., nonuse values do not necessarily imply any behavioral response).
They had noted that: ". . . behavioral contingent valuation is a deeply flawed methodology for measuring nonuse
values, one that does not estimate what its proponents claim to be estimating. . . .  There is a history of anomalous
results in contingent valuation surveys that seem closely tied to the embedding problem.  Although this problemSmith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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use values the composition of the "n" in equation (5) is rarely "clearcut".  As in the case of those
contributing to estimates of the costs of regulations, the definition of whose benefits count is also
fundamental to what can be expected from a devolved system.
Figure 1 illustrates how this can happen.  It takes the 12 counties in the Schwabe model
comprising the primary components of the Neuse watershed and computes the net benefits of the
proposed 30 percent reduction in nutrient loadings for each.  These estimates are derived from a
fairly crude benefit transfer.  That is, they do not come from a specific analysis of people's
willingness to pay for a 30 percent reduction in nitrogen loadings in the Neuse River.24  To
illustrate the spatial differences we have placed the estimates on the map, reporting the aggregate
benefits (in thousands of dollars), net benefits assuming a CAC policy regime, and the number of
households in each county.  Table 4 reports the estimates by county CAC and IB approaches to
realizing the 30 percent reduction in 1994 dollars.  With the CAC policy, only two of the
counties, Greene and Jones, experience losses but this is enough to make our point.  It is clear
                                                
has been recognized in the literature for over a decade, it has not been solved.  Thus, we conclude that current
contingent valuation methods should not be used for damage assessment or for benefit cost analysis." (pp. 62-63).
24 In a separate analysis Smith and Schwabe used a random utility model (RUM) developed by Smith and Liu
along with a model linking nutrient loadings to sport fishing quality (Smith, Liu, and Palmquist [1993]) to
evaluate the impact of a 36 percent reduction in nitrogen loadings on the Neuse.  The RUM was based on a 1988
(followup to the 1987) National Marine Fisheries Service survey that was conducted by Nancy Bockstael and
Kenneth McConnell of the University of Maryland.  This followup involved fishing parties intercepted in North
Carolina.
    The per trip Hicksian consumer surplus from the quality improvement (in 1988 dollars) was estimated at
$13.29.  Using the estimated number of trips taken by only NC sport fishing anglers from 1991 National Survey
of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife Associated survey, together with the number of North Carolina sport fishing
anglers and the fraction of the fishing parties using locations around the Neuse River (adjusting the benefits for
the higher percent of reduction), our estimates suggested between $3.25 and $5.83 million dollar benefit.
These estimates assume either 12 or 22.7 percent of the trips originate from areas affected by the Neuse River.
They are limited to trips made by North Carolina anglers (estimated at 1.94 million per year).
    The benefit transfer underlying the estimates in Table 4 and Figure 1 relate to all possible sources of benefits
from the water quality improvement to North Carolina residents in the area.  When compared with these
benefits to sport fishing alone, the total benefits seem plausible.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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Figure 1 is available from the authors.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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from the estimates in Figure 1 (and Table 4) that decision about the composition of the region
given authority for nitrogen control will influence the extent of excess demand for water quality
improvement.  Moreover, to make this argument in a fairly persuasive way we do not need to
extend the market area to include counties that are "outside" the set linked through the watershed
to water quality in the sound.
TABLE 4:  Net Benefits of a 30 Percent Reduction in Nitrogen















Aggregate Net Benefit 20,388 23,515
a  Counties are ordered from most distant to most proximate location to the Pamlico Sound.
b  Estimates are in thousands of dollars and do not adjust for the fact that benefits are in 1995
dollars and cost in 1994.
Our benefit estimates are derived from a telephone-mail-telephone survey.  In the first
stage, 1,002 households in North Carolina were contacted by telephone, collecting attitudinal,
demographic, and economic characteristics.  In the process respondents were asked if they would
be willing to participate in a second telephone interview that required them to provide their
mailing address so they could send information about issues affecting the water quality of NorthSmith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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Carolina's rivers and coastal areas.  540 of the original 1,002 respondents completed the second
interview.25
To estimate the benefits of controlling nitrogen loadings that impact the quality of coastal
resources, two plans to regulate the operations of large hog farms were described in different
booklets that were randomly assigned to each person who agreed to the second interview.  The
booklets included color photos of hog operations and described how regulations would reduce
nutrients in surface and groundwater, as well as reduce the risk of future waste spills from large
farms' waste handling systems into North Carolina rivers.  These reductions were described in
qualitative terms.  The plans can be distinguished based on how much of the control costs to
private operators would be shared by the state.  The descriptions were closely aligned to the
actual text of proposals discussed at the time in the state legislature.
The proposal we consider for our benefit estimate does not bundle private cost sharing
with regulations and monitoring intended to realize nitrogen control.  It also does not
guarantee the 30 percent reduction envisioned in our cost analysis.  Moreover it is described as
a statewide initiative that relies on regulations imposed on large hog farms, and not one
targeted to the Neuse River or one affecting other sources of nitrogen -- the cropping activities
and wastewater treatment plants.26
                                               
25 Mansfield and Smith [1996] investigated the importance of selection effects with initial agreement to
participate in the survey (using a model with county level aggregate data following Papke and Woolridge [1993])
and the selection effects associated with those respondents who answered the first phase survey completing the
second interview.  While age, education, and gender were important determinants of the likelihood of
completing this survey, the results did not indicate that either selection effect was important to choice models
derived for the contingent valuation question associated with the plan to regulate large hog farms.
26 The text of the question associated with the plan to regulate large hog farms was distinguished according to
whether it involved some cost sharing of initial capital costs (with farmers) or not and its order in the telephone
interview.  Our results relate to the plan without cost sharing when asked first.  (Respondents were reminded of the
plan which involved three changes in hog farms operations).  We review the full sequence of questions as follows:Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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Our benefit estimates assume the respondents' answers to discrete, take it or leave it
contingent valuation (CV), questions provide adequate measures of household willingness-to-
pay for a benefit transfer analysis.  The CV questions suggest that respondents will have to pay
for the regulations because state income taxes must increase from $10 to $750 each year to
pay for increased monitoring associated with the proposed new rules.27
This transfer may well seem a considerable "stretch" (given survey design) of the
available benefit measures.  It is not clear, however, that we are overstating the willingness to
pay at the household level.  Indeed, because the majority of the nutrient loadings on the Neuse
are due to cropping and wastewater loadings, not the operations of hog farms.  This focus may
                                                
     The booklet described a plan with new regulations for reducing the potential contamination of coastal waters
from releases of hog waste in the eastern counties of North Carolina.
9.   Do you remember the plan?
01   yes
02   no (go to 9b)
9a. As you recall, the plan applies to large hog farms. (go to 9c)
9b. The plan applies only to large hog farms.
9c. It would require three changes in their operations.  Their waste lagoons would be required to use mechanical techniques to
increase the natural decay of the waste and reduce odor.  Reinforced lagoons with plastic liners and annual inspections would
be required.  This would reduce the chances of accident spills in the leakage of nutrients into groundwater.  And finally,
spraying of waste would not be allowed within 1000 feet of a wetland or a river.  This plan would be in addition to other
actions the state is now undertaking.
9d. Would you like me to repeat anything about the plan?
01   yes
02   no
10.  These requirements would raise the costs of operations at hog farms.  Because they would be among the most stringent in
the nation, it is anticipated that some farms would close and the major firms in the industry would move some operations
outside the state.  This would increase unemployment in eastern North Carolina.
Here is how the plan for increased regulations and monitoring of the large hog farms would be paid for.  Large hog farms would be
required to pay for the mechanical processing the hog waste, the enhanced lagoons, and the controls on spraying.  The state would
pay for the increased inspections to assure the plan works.
To pay for these annual inspections, there would have to be an increase in North Carolina residents' state income taxes.  For
your household it would be an additional (randomize and keep track: $10, $25, $50, $75, $100, $125, $375, $750) each year.
This would be in addition to the amount you now pay in state income taxes. This payment would be required each year to
maintain this program.  Please keep in mind your current income and the things you now buy.
If this plan to regulate large hog farms were on statewide referendum with your taxes increased by (repeat amount from above)
and you could vote on the plan, would you vote for or against it?
01   for the plan (go to 12a)
02   against the plan (go to 12)
03   don't know (don't offer, go to 11a)
27 By using the per household estimates for our survey (with some adjustment explained below) we are
assuming these differences would not markedly impact the WTP estimates for a plan targeted at the Neuse
River with the households we include in our analysis.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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imply our estimated WTP is a conservative measure of the value people would place on a plan
perceived as addressing all aspects of the problem.
Equally important we applied a conservative method to develop the aggregate
estimates from our household estimates of willingness to pay.  Based on the estimated median
WTP (derived from fitting a Weibull survival model to the CV responses) we adjusted the
estimate assigned to households in each county by the response rate to our final survey (66
percent).28  This procedure assumes nonrespondents had a zero value for the proposed plan to
regulate hog farms.  Finally, we assume only households in the 12 county area covered by the
Schwabe model of the Neuse River watershed would be willing to pay.  The estimated overall
benefits from the plan (with the median estimate) would be 29.6 million (in 1994 dollars).  This
                                               
28 Using a Weibull survival model to estimate the responses from the first question, the estimated median
willingness to pay was $94.90 per year.  The 95 percent confidence interval was $46.07 to $195.50.  Because
the survey was conducted between November 1995 and January 1996 we used the December 1995 Consumer
Price Index to adjust the benefit to 1994 dollars for the aggregate estimates.  Household income was reported
for the last tax year, 1994, (1995 income taxes were not filled until after the survey was completed).  The
adjustment implies benefit measures in 1994 dollars that were about 95 percent of the 1995 levels.
   The probit choice model from the CV data suggests that the proposed tax amount was a significant
determinant of stated choices.  One of the models reported in Mansfield and Smith [1996] is given as follows:
State vote for plan   = -2.44 -.0013 tax amount
(-1.66) (-2.70)
+.055 Household income +.655 College Grad.
(1.35) (in ten thousand dollars) (2.20)   (=1)
+.204 Likelihood of hog waste spills +.125 Regulate Hog Farms
(3.47) (0.54)   (=1)
-.248 Live on Farm +.877 IMR1




     This model was estimated for only the respondents receiving the booklet and question relating to the plan
without cost sharing.  IMR1 and IMR2 correspond to the inverse Mills ratios for initial agreement to participate
(based on aggregate data) and participating in second phase sample.  Missing values of household income were
imputed for this model.  The remaining qualitative variables are defined as follows:
Likelihood of Spills is a 1 (not likely at all) to 10 (very likely) Likert scale for individual's perception of possibility of future
spills of hog waste comparable to events in North Carolina in summer of 1995.
Regulate Hog Farms is an attitudinal variable that =1 if respondent indicated regulating hog farms to reduce changes of
waste spills was very important, zero otherwise.
Live on a Farm is equal to one if respondent lives on a farm and zero otherwise.
    The Z statistics reported below the estimated parameters are based on robust estimates to account for potential
heteroscedasticity due to selection effects.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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compares with overall costs of the CAC program for a 30 percent reduction of 8.1 million
dollars to yield positive net benefits.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Wally's research on federalism has emphasized the need to balance the simplicity of
conceptual models designed to highlight the information necessary to make jurisdictional
decisions with comparable attention to the specific details relevant to each application.  We
believe these "details" are especially important in structuring the jurisdictional responsibilities
for the design and implementation of different aspects of environmental policy.  Our
conclusions about the scope for devolution, in some respects, reiterate the important lessons
found in the design of Kneese's environmental management efforts in the seventies.  Linkages
in environmental resources create spillover effects that cannot be ignored in evaluating the
costs of attaining any ambient quality level.  Our example of the Neuse River suggested that
whether we identify jurisdiction by activity or location, the effects on the cost of reducing
nitrogen loadings can be substantial.
This is a different perspective than most discussions of fiscal federalism, where the
production component of the delivery of local public goods is considered in less detail than are
issues related to the available alternatives for financing public intervention or the consideration
given to the implications of preference heterogeneity for the amounts and types of public
goods provided by different jurisdictions.  Here it is clear that regulations can impact costs in
different ways that are affected by the definition of the jurisdiction assigned responsibility.  A
simple identification of the spillovers is not enough to assure these external effects will beSmith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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taken seriously without credible oversight.  Few lessons are more clearly found in international
environmental problems than this one.
The preference component of these decisions is also, we believe, more complex than with
local public goods.  The spatial dimension of environmental resources implies that in a number of
cases "users" will extend beyond local residents.  We expect (and for some approaches to non-
market valuation we rely on the fact) that people will travel to some environmental resources to
experience their services.  This feature of the consumption of environmental services implies the
user population is harder to define by residential location alone.
Nonuse values are also harder to dismiss as speculative for many environmental
resources.  It is harder to develop (without substantial effort and cost devoted to the estimates)
values that will reliably distinguish those with very low or zero willingness to pay.
Both of these differences are central to how one must address the extent of devolution
adopted for decisions involving the direct management or the regulation of activities impacting
environmental resources.  Our arguments concern differences for both the cost and the
preference components of the federalism problem.  They began from analyses that sought to
understand the specifics of how each environmental resource is affected by and contributes to
people's activities.  Understanding the contribution of "nature" expressed in these terms is an
essential component of the tasks to be addressed in environmental federalism.Smith, Schwabe, and Mansfield RFF 97-30
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